News

Mar 27

2023

By

||

||

1 Like

||

Joint Statement: States & investors have a responsibility to curtail the abuse of spyware

Monday, 27 March, 2023.


We, the undersigned organisations and individuals, call on the governments convening the 
Summit for Democracy 2023 to prioritise human rights due diligence for spyware technologies  on the Summit’s agenda. We have witnessed and reported on how spyware has been repeatedly used to silence journalists, surveil human rights defenders, muzzle dissent, suppress freedom of  expression of minorities, target LGBTQ+ persons and women, intimidate academia and  discourage peaceful protests. To achieve greater transparency, accountability, peace and a more  prosperous future for all, in alignment with the stated objective of the Summit, states and  investors must act to prevent the proliferation and abuse of spyware. 

The unlawful and arbitrary use of spyware has a direct and often disproportionate impact on the  right to privacy and degrades other human rights and civic freedoms.1 For example, NSO Group’s  Pegasus spyware is linked to at least 300 acts of physical violence in more than 45 countries  worldwide. Women, LGBTQ+ persons and other vulnerable communities targeted by spyware  face distinct risks of social exclusion, physical, psychological and sexual violence

Companies have haphazardly sold and exported hacking technologies, impacting democratic  processes, deepening authoritarian rule, and degrading human rights around the world (with  some companies evading export licenses all together). Of the cases that have come to light, at  least 14 world leaders, government officials and allies have also been identified as potential  targets, putting their security and rights at risk. Investors, too, increasingly recognise that the  human rights risks related to these technologies represent a material risk to their portfolios and  they have an ethical, normative and fiduciary responsibility to address them. This is further  evidenced by the fact that shareholders from some of the largest tech companies filed proposals on various human rights issues at the upcoming 2023 Annual General Meeting season and during  the past 2022 Annual General Meetings season. The bottom line is that states and investors,  including venture capital (VC) firms, have a critical role and shared interest in preventing the  abuse of spyware. 

Since 2017, the world’s largest 50 VC firms (three quarters of which are domiciled in the United  States) have collectively raised 309.2 billion USD, which is larger than the GDP of most countries. Early-stage investors ultimately influence which tech startups receive funding and which ideas are deemed worthy of developing. VC firms help shape the future of technology, and with it the  future of our economies, politics and societies, and the realisation of human rights

In accordance with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, VCs  have a responsibility to undertake human rights due diligence when investing in spyware due to  the scope, severity of impact and low likelihood for remedy when the technology is abused. VCs,  particularly those based in the Global North, must address the imbalance of power that spyware  imposes on at-risk communities within their own countries and those in the Global South. This  entails taking steps to identify, prevent, mitigate, remedy and account for human rights impacts through meaningful stakeholder engagement with affected communities—including during the  iterative phases of product development prior to deployment. 

However, there have been very few public responses and disclosures from technology  investors about their human rights due diligence practices to prevent these abuses, and those  that invest in spyware are even more opaque about their procedures. The responses that civil  society has received rarely address the salient human rights risks at hand. 

States have an obligation to regulate the spyware industry, as well as their investors, to prevent  and mitigate human rights harms. States must therefore strengthen the collective enforcement  of legal, operational and financial impacts for spyware companies who operate outside of international human rights standards. Towards this aim, we recommend that states: 

  • Ban the sale of spyware until a system of safeguards is in place to prevent human rights  abuses and hold companies liable for their negative human rights impacts. Increase  assistance, both preventative and reactive, for at-risk groups who are targeted by  spyware, including human rights defenders. 
  • Ensure that all companies, including VC firms, domiciled in their countries are required to  undertake human rights due diligence in respect of their global operations and  investments. The same should apply for companies that seek to do business within their  domestic jurisdictions. This includes comprehensive transparency requirements for  investors, including public disclosures from VCs about their investments. 
  • Ensure that all companies, including VCs carry out stakeholder engagement with a wide  range of actors, especially those most impacted by their products and services including  at-risk individuals in the Global North and those disparately impacted in the Global South,  to understand the implications of their investments and evolve their practices. 
  • Ensure that government agencies carry out effective human rights due diligence as a ,  especially surveillance-tech and cybersecurity companies. 
  • Hold corporate entities, including VC firms, accountable for human rights abuses that  amount to criminal behaviour. Commit to cooperating in good-faith investigations about  the abuse of spyware in other jurisdictions. 

 

The shape of our economies, politics, and societies should not be founded on the technology  sector’s prioritisation of short-term profits, particularly when it blurs the longer-term vision of securing human rights for all. This is only possible if there is greater international pressure on  companies and investors, in particular for VCs and others in the private equity ecosystem,  including limited partners (LPs), to acknowledge the impact that their investment decisions have  on human rights and the lives of people. Spyware poses too great a threat to not be prioritised.  

As civil society organisations and individuals who have been tracking the impacts of spyware and/or engaging with companies and investors on the topic of human rights due diligence in the  technology sector, we remain available for further dialogue and assistance. 

Signed: 

The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 

Heartland Initiative 

Amnesty International 

Empower 

Open MIC 

Derechos Digitales 

Hiperderecho 

Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) Fundación Acceso 

Cambodian Center for Human Rights 

IPANDETEC 

Digital Rights Foundation 

ALQST For Human Rights 

Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies 

Access Now 

Internet Freedom Foundation 

Media Matters for Democracy 

Unwanted Witness 

Digital Freedom Fund 

Red en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (R3D) 

Usuarios Digitales 

FairSquare 

International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) 

European Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ECNL) 

Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) 

Thai Netizen Network 

CyberPeace Institute 

Association for Civil Rights (ADC) 

Digital Defenders Partnership 

TEDIC 

International Service for Human Rights

Center for the Studies of Law, Justice and Society- Dejusticia Centro de Estudios en Libertad de Expresión (CELE) IMPARSIAL (the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor) Paradigm Initiative (PIN) 

ALT Advisory 

The WHRDMENA Coalition 

Acción Constitucional 

Data Privacy Brasil Research Association 

SMEX 

Centro per la Cooperazione Internazionale (CCI) / OBC Transeuropa Front Line Defenders  

7amleh: The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group 

Ranking Digital Rights 

Open Net (Korea)

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *